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Abstract
The paper reports a set of operational rules for ranking income distributions that
could be used, given appropriate data, to address a range of policy issues
concerning the economic welfare of the agricultural community, the
comparability of agricultural and non-agricultural incomes, and the extent and
depth of poverty in farming.  The rules are based on stochastic dominance
procedures and are consistent with social preferences for higher incomes and a
more equal distribution of income.  Their application is illustrated by means of a
comparative analysis of the farm family income situation in the member states of
the European Union based on FADN data.
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11. Introduction
The level of farming income in the European Union (EU) is expected to diminish
as a result of the move towards liberalisation of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), begun with the MacSharry reforms and reinforced by international
agreements under the World Trade Organisation.  Moreover, changes in the
method of domestic farm support, from high market prices to greater use of
decoupled compensatory payments and premiums, are likely to have important
implications for the way in which farming income is distributed both between
and within member states.  The level and distribution of farming income has
been a subject of recurrent interest to agricultural economists, but rarely has this
involved more than the reporting of average measures of income, the
construction of Lorenz curves and the calculation of Gini coefficients.
Advances in the welfare economics literature on income and poverty now offer
the opportunity for a more sophisticated analysis, and this is the subject of our
paper.  We report developments in welfare theory which extend the traditional
approach through the definition of specific classes of welfare functions
consistent with social preferences for higher incomes and a more equal
distribution of incomes.1  These developments have led to the derivation of
operational rules for the ordinal ranking of income distributions that enable the
comparative evaluation both of the overall well-being of communities and of the
incidence and depth of poverty in those communities.  Given appropriate data on
the total income of farm households, these rules might be used to explore a range
of policy issues concerning the economic well-being of the agricultural
community and the agricultural poverty problem.
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reports the theory underlying
the ordering of income distributions and outlines how welfare and poverty
2evaluations can be implemented using simple operational rules.  Section 3
considers empirical issues of estimation and statistical inference from sample
information, and outlines a non-parametric procedure to derive orderings of
income distributions.  Section 4 presents a comparative evaluation of the Farm
Family Income situation in the member states of the Community of Twelve
(EU12) based on an illustrative empirical analysis of Farm Accountancy Data
Network (FADN) data for the years 1990/91 through 1994/95.  The final section
summarises the main findings of the paper and identifies the need for the
establishment of a more satisfactory source of microeconomic information on the
total income of agricultural households.
2.  Ordering income distributions
The economic welfare of the farming community has been a fundamental
concern of agricultural policy-makers within the European Union.  Thus, the
Treaty of Rome expresses a commitment to ’ensure a fair standard of living for
the agricultural community, particularly by increasing the individual earnings of
persons engaged in agriculture’.  This has commonly been taken to mean that
agricultural incomes should be comparable (in general or on average) with non-
agricultural incomes or, at least, in excess of some arbitrary poverty threshold
(see Hill, 1991; Zioganas, 1988).  But the lack of any precise definition of the
income objective has frustrated analysis of the economic well-being of the
agricultural community for policy purposes (Blandford, 1996).
Recent developments in applied welfare theory, however, offer a solution to this
problem by allowing comparisons to be made between income distributions
without the need to fully specify the nature of the social welfare function.   For
this purpose, it is commonly assumed that the social welfare function W can be
written as a symmetric function of individual incomes that is invariant to the size
of the population (see Willig, 1981), from which it follows that cumulative
3distribution functions (CDFs) for income contain sufficient information to rank
social states.  In particular, social preferences based upon the class of increasing
welfare functions imply that income distributions may be ranked using the
criterion of first degree stochastic or rank dominance (Saposnik, 1981) while a
further preference for mean-preserving progressive transfers implies ranking on
the basis of second degree stochastic or generalised Lorenz dominance
(Shorrocks, 1983). Moreover, equivalent orderings of income distributions can
be generated by specific classes of poverty measure where these give rise to
unambiguous rankings in the sense that the orderings are invariant to the
arbitrary choice of poverty line (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988).  These results can
provide the basis for an analysis of agricultural income and poverty issues
founded on explicit assumptions about the nature of social preferences.
First degree stochastic dominance (FSD)
To illustrate the concepts of first and second degree stochastic dominance, we
consider three hypothetical distributions of income, yR, yS and yT, among a
population of size n.   Each income vector y=(y1, y2, ..., yn) is ordered in terms of
increasing income with the minimum and maximum attainable incomes denoted
respectively by ymin and ymax (i.e. ymin≤y1≤y2 ... ≤yn≤ymax).  Let F(y) denote the
CDF and Y(p) the inverse CDF or quantile function, such that for some
distribution yR, FR(y) is the proportion of the population whose income falls
below any arbitrary income level y (ymin≤ y≤ymax) and YR(p) is the p-th income
quantile of the population (0≤p≤1).  According to the FSD criterion, yR
dominates yS if and only if:
FR(y) ≤ FS(y) for all y and FR(yi) ≠ FS(yi) for some i (1)
or equivalently:
4YR(p) ≥ YS(p) for all p and YR(pi) ≠ YS(pi) for some i (1′)
so that ranking involves comparison of either CDFs or inverse CDFs.
Saposnik (1981) identifies FSD with rank dominance given that the i-th poorest
individual must be at least as well off, and at least one individual must be better
off, for one distribution to be preferred to another.  FSD thus derives its
normative content from a combination of the Pareto principle with the axiom of
anonymity, and is consistent with the entire class of increasing social welfare
functions for which:
W(yR) > W(yS) iff yR≠yS and y yi iR S≥  for all i (2)
FSD may be interpreted as a pure efficiency criterion since it does not entail any
preference for equality.  In particular, mean-preserving income transfers between
any pair of individuals can not lead to an improvement in welfare under any
circumstances.
Foster and Shorrocks (1988) have also linked FSD with the head-count poverty
ratio, P(α=1, z), which is the first member of the class of poverty measures
P(α,z) proposed by Foster et al. (1984) where the value of α corresponds to the
degree of stochastic dominance. (α=1, 2, ...., ∞.).  The head-count ratio is defined
as the proportion of the population at or below any poverty line z:
P(α=1, z) = F(z) for ymin≤ z≤ymax (3)
from which it follows that if distribution yR rank dominates yS then head-count
poverty in yR cannot exceed that in yS, regardless of the choice of income
threshold z.
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Figure 1 is adapted from Thistle (1989) and illustrates the concept of FSD by
depicting the CDFs of the three hypothetical income distributions.  The diagram
is drawn so that yR (and yT) dominates yS according to the FSD criterion since FR
lies everywhere below FS relative to the horizontal axis and everywhere above FS
relative to the vertical axis.  Thus head-count poverty is unambiguously lower in
yR as the proportion of the population falling below any given level of income is
lower for distribution yR than for yS.  In contrast, FR and FT cross, with the result
that the two income distributions can not be ordered using the FSD criterion.
If the distribution functions cross in a pairwise comparison, the analysis may still
be taken forward in one of two ways (Bishop et al., 1993).  First, despite the
6crossing it may be possible to draw conclusions about poverty if the poverty line
z can reasonably be assumed to be below the crossing point.  For example, the
poverty line z in Figure 1 lies to the left of the crossing point X so the head-count
poverty ratio is unambiguously lower in distribution yR than in yT since FR rank
dominates FT at all income levels below that at X.  Thus, testing for rank
dominance on truncated distributions yields the dominance ordering of head-
count poverty providing the poverty line can be assumed to be below the
truncation point.
Second, further restrictions can be placed on the class of admissible welfare
functions by assuming a social preference for equality.  This leads to the
application of the second degree stochastic or generalised Lorenz dominance
criterion.
Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD)
Consider again the two distributions of income yR and yS, then yR dominates yS
according to the SSD criterion if and only if:
F ( )  F ( )R
min
S
miny y
u du u du
y y
≤∫ ∫  for all y and FR(yi) ≠ FS(yi) for some i (4)
or equivalently:
Y ( )  Y ( )R S
0
u du u du
p p
≥∫ ∫
0
 for all p and YR(pi) ≠ YS(pi) for some i (4′)
where u is a variable of integration.  Ranking thus involves comparison either of
the integrals of the CDFs or of the integrals of the inverse CDFs .  Comparison of
(1) with (4) indicates that FSD implies SSD in the sense that if yR stochastically
dominates yS in the first degree then yR will also stochastically dominate yS in the
second degree.
7The integral of the inverse CDF is more commonly known as the generalised
Lorenz curve, GL(p), and may be simply obtained by scaling up the ordinary
Lorenz curve by the mean of the distribution.  Shorrocks (1983) identifies SSD
with Generalised Lorenz dominance given that the combined income of the
poorest 100p per cent of the population is at least as large, and for at least one pi
is strictly larger, for one distribution to be preferred to another.  SSD therefore
embodies a preference for equality since mean-preserving income transfers from
rich to poor will be welfare-improving.  This proposition is known as Dalton’s
principle and is shown by Dasgupta et al. (1973) to imply that the welfare
function is Schur-concave. Thus application of the SSD criterion is consistent
with the class of increasing, Schur-concave social welfare functions WS for
which:
W(yR) > W(yS) iff yR≠yS and  y y
i=1
j
i
i=1
j
i
R S∑ ∑≥  for all j = 1, 2, ..., n. (5)
SSD incorporates both preferences for efficiency and equality, and is compatible
with the Utilitarian ethic that social welfare is the sum of individual utilities
which are, in turn, concave in income (i.e., there is decreasing marginal utility of
income).  The criterion implies that higher mean income can more than offset a
loss of equality, which makes the SSD criterion less restrictive than the formerly
common practice of ranking income distributions on the joint basis of their
means and Lorenz curves.  But the converse does not apply in that greater
equality cannot compensate for a decrease in mean income, however small.
Foster and Shorrocks (1988) additionally link SSD with the income-gap poverty
ratio, P(α=2,z), which is defined as the normalised sum of the income shortfalls
of the population below any poverty line z:
8  )F( )ddF(-=)2,=P(
miny


 −
=∫ 


z
z
zuu
z
uz
z z
z µ
α  for ymin≤ z≤ymax (6)
where µz  is the mean income of the poor. It follows that if distribution yR
stochastically dominates yS in the second degree then income-gap poverty in yR
cannot exceed that in yS, regardless of the choice of poverty line z.
Figure 1 also serves to illustrate the concept of SSD. Because yR (and yT)
dominates yS according to the FSD criterion, the same is true for the SSD
criterion.   However, the figure is drawn so that yR also dominates yT according to
the SSD criterion, even though FR and FT cross, since the integral of FR with
respect to the horizontal axis (area ymin zA) is less than that of FT (area ymin  zB) for
any arbitrary poverty line z and with respect to the vertical axis (area 0pA) is
greater than that of FT (area 0pC) for any arbitrary population proportion p.  Thus
income-gap poverty is lower for yR than for either yS or yT at any given poverty
line z.
Finally, as with FSD, it may still be possible to rank two distributions even if
they can not be ordered using the SSD criterion.  First, it may be possible to draw
conclusions about income-gap poverty from an SSD ordering of truncated
distributions providing the poverty line can reasonably be assumed to be below
the truncation point.  Second, one may also test for stochastic dominance of the
third or higher degree although this path is not pursued further in the paper due to
the informational limitations of the data set employed in the study.  Third degree
dominance further implies social preferences for progressive transfers at lower
income levels and is associated with the distribution-sensitive index P(α=3,z) of
Foster et al. (1984).  In the limit, q-th degree dominance tends to the maximin
criterion as q tends to infinity (see Lambert, 1993).
93.  Estimation and statistical inference
Microdata on the incomes of farmers and their households is generally obtained
from farm account surveys, household budget surveys or tax records.  However
simple comparison of income distributions constructed directly from such sample
information may lead to erroneous inferences about differences in overall welfare
or poverty levels because of sampling error, so the use of methods of statistical
inference in relation to dominance criteria is advisable (Howes, 1996).
Following the pioneering work of Beach and Davidson (1983), a range of non-
parametric (distribution-free) asymptotic tests for overall welfare and poverty
dominance has been developed.  We adapt the procedures outlined in Kakwani
(1993) and extended in Zheng et al. (1995), since our requirement is to compare
income distributions at a given set of income thresholds or levels (i.e. income
class boundaries) rather than at a given set of population quantiles (e.g. deciles or
quintiles).
Suppose we have a random sample of m individual units whose incomes are
given as y1, y2, ..., ym then consistent estimators of the head-count ratio and
income-gap poverty measures, P(α=1,z) and P(α=2,z) respectively, are given by:
$ (P , ) = 1
m
 I - y 1
m
 M ( , ) where M ( , ) = I - y  i
i=1
m i
i
i=1
m
i i
iα α α
α α
z
z
z
z z
z
z
∑ ∑

 ≡




− −1 1
(7)
and Ii is an indicator variable which is set equal to one if yi≤ z and zero
otherwise.  Kakwani (1993) shows that m [P , ) P , )]$ ( (α αz z−  is asymptotically
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2 =E{[Mi(α,z) − P(α,z)] 2}
for which a consistent estimator is given as:
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{ } { } { }$ $ $ $σ α α α α2 1= 1
m
  M ( , )  -  P( , )   P(2 , ) -  P( , )
i=1
m
i
2  2  2∑
 = −z z z z (8)
and the estimated standard error of $P( , )α z is then simply $ /σ m .  These
findings provide the basis for a straightforward test for the equivalence of
poverty levels between two income distributions, say, yR and yS.  Thus, given the
poverty line or income threshold z, let $ $P ( , ) and P ( , )R Sα αz z  be the sample
poverty indices estimated from randomly and independently drawn samples of
sizes mR and mS respectively.  Then under the null hypothesis
H : P ( , ) = P ( , )0 R S$ $α αz z , the test statistic:
[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]v = P ( , ) - P ( , ) / m / mR S R R S S2 2$ $ $ $ /α α σ σz z + 1 2 (9)
has a standard normal distribution where $σR2  and $σS2  are the corresponding
estimated variances.  Hence, if v is significantly negative (positive) then yR has a
lower (higher) poverty level than yS at the specified income level z.
Zheng et al. (1993) subsequently apply the test statistic v to the comparison of
multiple poverty lines based on simultaneous inference procedures that require
the use of the studentised maximum modulus (SMM) distribution.2  Consider the
multiple comparison of the two distributions yR and yS at a set of common
income levels that partition the income range into K mutually exclusive and
exhaustive classes.  Let vk (k=1,2,.. K) be the value of the test statistic evaluated
at the upper boundary of the k’th class,3 then the test procedure allows four
possible outcomes.  First, poverty dominance (and hence stochastic dominance
of the corresponding degree) of yR over yS requires that no vk is significantly
positive and at least one of them is significantly negative.  Second, dominance of
yS over yR requires that no vk is significantly negative and at least one of them is
significantly positive, since the test is symmetric.  Third, neither distribution is
11
dominant if one or more vk are significantly negative and one or more vk are
significantly positive.  In this case, limiting the comparison to the first J (J<K)
class boundaries may yield a conclusive ordering over the truncated distributions.
Finally, the two distributions can not be distinguished if no vk is significantly
different from zero.
Turning to the particular cases of interest, the estimator of the head-count poverty
ratio , $ (P , )1 z , is simply qz/m, where qz is the number of units in the sample with
income less than z, and the corresponding variance estimator is given as
{qz/m}(1−{qz/m}).  Hence, inferences can be drawn about FSD and head-count
poverty dominance so long as grouped frequency data are available by income
class, which is generally the case in even the most minimal summary
presentation of income survey results.
Second, the estimator of the income-gap poverty ratio, $ (P , )2 z , is given as
{qz/m}(z−y z )/z where y z  is the cumulative sample mean (i.e. the mean income
of those units with incomes less than z), and the corresponding variance
estimator is given as {qz/m}[s2z +(1−{qz/m})(z−y z )2]/z2 where s2z  is the
cumulative sample variance (i.e. the variance of those units with incomes less
than z).  Estimation of income-gap poverty is practicable given data on sample
frequencies and mean income levels by income class for a known set of class
boundaries, while knowledge of the sample variance of each income class is also
required for statistical inference.4  However, if sample variances are unknown
then inferences may still be drawn given approximate estimates of these
variances obtained using appropriate interpolation techniques, while Anderson
(1996) proposes a general estimation and testing framework based on a linear
12
interpolation methodology which is applicable in the absence of information on
both sample means and variances.
In the case of the FADN survey data employed in this paper, results are
presented in a standardised summary format which records sample frequencies
and mean income levels by income class but gives no information either on the
overall sample range or on sample variances.  The sample variance of each
income class was therefore approximated by means of the split-histogram
interpolation technique recommended by Cowell and Mehta (1982) with the
widths of the lowest and highest income classes specified as twice the (absolute)
difference between the respective class mean and interior bound.  The resultant
SSD rankings proved to be relatively insensitive to the particular choices of
interpolation technique and range assumption used to generate the sample
variance estimates.  By way of comparison, we note below that making
allowance for sampling error through the use of the statistical test procedures
generated far more conclusive rankings than simple numerical (zero variance)
comparisons.
13
4. Empirical Analysis
The imprecise nature of the income objective of the CAP is reflected in a
corresponding lack of well-specified operational goals either in terms of the
targeted income variable or the intended recipients.  Recent discussion has
focused on the total income of agricultural households (TIAH) and has led to the
development of a new range of economic indicators at the sectoral level (Hill,
1996a).  However, no corresponding provision has been made at the farm or
household level so that the annual FADN survey remains the only consistent
source of microdata currently available on farming incomes in the member states
of the Community of Twelve (EU12).  This survey is widely recognised to
provide a less than satisfactory basis for the analysis of the economic well-being
of the agricultural community due to problems of coverage, scope and
methodology.  Nevertheless, Hill (1991) suggests in his authoritative review that
FADN data on the distribution of farm family income per holding (FFI/holding)
could provide ‘an important guide to the existence and locations of holdings
generating small amounts of income for their occupiers’ (p.43) that may be of
assistance in the continuing attempts to redistrubute income support among
farmers (Commission of the European Communities, 1991; European
Commission, 1997).  The following analysis of FFI/holding by member state
serves this particular objective, although it is more generally intended to illustrate
the nature of the welfare and poverty comparisons that could be made if a micro-
counterpart of the TIAH were to be established.
The FADN survey is based on a representative sample of some 58000
‘commercial’ farms which market the bulk of their production and have
economically significant levels of agricultural activity.  It excludes many small
farms whose occupiers might generally be considered part of the agricultural
community for policy purposes: only 50% of the holdings recorded in the 1993
14
Farm Structure Survey were covered by FADN.  FFI/holding is currently the
main FADN income indicator reported in official statistics and is a residual
measure of farm business income which represents the return on the labour and
owned capital (including land) of the farmer and family.  ‘In practice it accords
broadly with the notion of profit from farming’ (Hill, 1996b).  However, FADN
does not provide reliable estimates of per capita farming incomes given
limitations in the concept and measurement of the unpaid labour of farmers and
their families (see Hill, 1991, pp.43-4), nor, more generally, enable incomes to be
adjusted to reflect the different needs of households of different size since data
are not collected on the composition of farm households.  Moreover, FADN does
not provide information on the total income position of farm households since
data are not collected on non-farm sources of income.  Thus, no conclusions
regarding the overall welfare of farm households or the extent of agricultural
poverty can be drawn from our results.
The main analysis was based on the 1994/95 FADN survey summary of
FFI/holding for six classes of income, with all monetary values converted from
national currencies into ECU at prevailing exchange rates. Table 1 reports the
estimates of the head-count and income-gap ratios calculated from these data,
together with the associated asymptotic standard errors.  The head-count ratios
show that the Mediterranean countries typically have the largest proportion of
farms with low incomes from farming, with more than 80% of farms in Portugal
and 50% of farms in Italy generating incomes of less than 5000 ECU.
Conversely, the Northern European states consistently have the highest
proportion of farms with high farm incomes, with less than 80% of farms in
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and United Kingdom generating
incomes below 50000 ECU.  The income-gap ratios point to the so-called
‘negative income problem’ in the Northern European states which is associated
15
with high levels of farm indebtedness (European Commission, 1995) and is
particularly severe in Denmark (where the average loss of the 44% of farms
found in the lowest income class was 8700 ECU) and the Netherlands (where the
bottom 23% of farms lost 14000 ECU each on average).  Nevertheless, overall
mean incomes were generally higher in the Northern states than in the
Mediterranean states and this is reflected in the lower estimates of the income-
gap ratios at the 200000 ECU threshold.
The ranking exercise was conducted using the estimates presented in Table 1,
though the number and spacing of the income thresholds are not ideally suited
for this purpose.  In particular, because the lowest income class accounts for a
high proportion of the sample farms in some member states, the ordering
generated by the FSD criterion proved unreliable with conclusive rankings
obtained for some pairings of member states even though the income-gap ratios
indicated a crossing of the two CDFs below the first income threshold of 5000
ECU.  We therefore focus exclusively on the orderings generated by the SSD
criterion as these seem likely to be more reliable given that the share of total farm
income accounted for by the lowest income class is much lower (and is, in some
cases, negative) than the proportion of farms.
The application of the SSD criterion to the full (non-truncated) income
distributions resulted in conclusive rankings of 42 of the 66 possible pairings of
member states using the statistical inference test procedure, with none of the
pairs of the distributions being statistically indistinguishable.  In contrast, simple
numerical comparison would have generated a more partial ordering with only
33
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of the pairings proving conclusive.  This difference in ranking ability is due to
the number of apparent ‘crossings’ that are revealed by the inference tests to be
insignificant once sampling errors are taken into account.  The finding that
inference-based dominance analysis leads to more complete orderings of
distributions than numerical (zero-variance) comparisons is a standard result in
the literature (see Bishop et al., 1993).
Figure 2a presents the resultant ordering of member states in the form of a Hesse
diagram in which dominance is indicated by a connected line flowing
downwards from the higher-ranked member state.  For example, Belgium
dominates France which in turn dominates Italy.  In general, the Northern
European states have higher mean incomes and therefore tend to dominate the
Mediterranean states under the SSD criterion.  However, the combined income of
the lowest income farms in some Northern states is smaller in absolute terms,
given the severity of the negative income problem, than that of the corresponding
farms in the Mediterranean states.  Thus, the Northern states do not uniformly
dominate the Mediterranean states in spite of the disparities in mean income
levels.  For example, the Netherlands does not dominate any of the
Mediterranean states and the United Kingdom does not dominate either Spain or
Greece.
The SSD criterion was also used to generate orderings of the member states with
the distributions truncated above each of the specified income thresholds. The
resultant orderings are more conclusive than that generated by application of the
SSD criterion to the full distributions, with 46 conclusive rankings at a truncation
point of 50000 ECU, 48 at 20000 ECU, and 60 at 5000 ECU.  Figure 2b
illustrates the ordering generated with the truncation point of 20000 ECU which
is greater than the EU12 average FFI/holding of 15100 ECU in 1994/95 and may
18
Figure 2a.  SSD ordering based on full distributions
Belgium
Luxembourg
France Greece
United Kingdom Spain
West Germany Ireland
Netherlands Italy
Denmark Portugal
Figure 2b.  SSD ordering based on distributions truncated above 20000 ECU.
Belgium
Luxembourg
France Greece
United Kingdom Spain
West Germany Ireland
Netherlands Italy
Denmark Portugal
Note: With infinite degrees of freedom, the 5% critical value of the SMM
distribution for 6 multiple comparisons is 2.631, and for 3 multiple comparisons
is 2.388 (Stoline and Ury, 1979).
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be reasonably assumed to represent a more than adequate level of farm family
income.  The structure of the Hesse diagram is broadly similar to that for the
ordering of the full distribution, but all of the Mediterranean states except
Portugal now dominate Denmark while Spain dominates the Netherlands as well.
The ordering of the truncated distribution thus provides a less clear-cut
assessment of the standing of the Northern European states relative to
Mediterranean states.
Finally, to examine the robustness of the orderings we repeated the analysis with
FADN data for the years 1990/91 to 1993/94, with all monetary values expressed
in 1995 ECU to eliminate the influence of both inflation and exchange rate
movements.5   The fine detail of the resultant orderings varies with the
fluctuating fortunes of the individual member states (in particular, the relative
positions of both Spain and the United Kingdom improve in the later years).
However, the broad structure of all of these orderings is similar to those of
1994/95 given that the ranking of the member states by mean income was
relatively stable over the period.  For example, Belgium was invariably ranked
above all other member states and Portugal was consistently dominated by all, or
virtually all, other member states with the exception of Denmark.  And it remains
the case that the most prosperous Northern European states never uniformly
dominate the Mediterranean states in spite of the disparities in mean income
levels.  In particular, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France were not
found to dominate Greece in any year.
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5.  Conclusion
The paper has reported a set of operational rules for ranking income distributions
which may be used to address a range of policy issues concerning the economic
welfare of the agricultural community, the comparability of agricultural and non-
agricultural incomes, and the extent and depth of poverty in farming.  The rules
are based on stochastic dominance procedures and may be derived from specific
restrictions on the form of the social welfare function that imply preferences for
higher incomes and a more equal distribution of income.  However, two
important advantages of these procedures are that they do not require that an
exact set of distributional weights be specified in order to draw welfare
conclusions, nor that a fixed poverty line be chosen in order to construct poverty
orderings (Bishop et al., 1993).
The application of the rules was illustrated by means of a comparative analysis of
farming income levels across the member states of the EU12 using FADN data
on farm family income per holding for the years 1990/91 through 1994/95.
Rankings were obtained with the SSD criterion and suggest that the overall farm
family income situation in the Northern European states was more favourable
than in the Mediterranean states given the existence of wide disparities in mean
income levels.  However, because of the negative income problem, the Northern
states do not uniformly dominate the Mediterranean states.  Indeed, restricting
the comparison to the bottom end of the income distribution, by excluding those
farms that might reasonably be assumed to generate more than adequate levels of
family income, revealed that the income shortfall was greater in the Netherlands
than in Spain, and greater in Denmark than in any of the Mediterranean states
except Portugal.  The use of the SSD criterion therefore leads to a less clear-cut
assessment than a simple comparison of mean income levels would suggest.
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These findings may be of some help in guiding the continuing attempts to
redistrubute income support among farmers (Commission of the European
Communities, 1991; European Commission, 1997). For example, the Southern
European states have long demanded additional measures to improve farm
structures and thereby help to counter the perceived bias of the CAP in favour of
‘Northern’ commodities (see Bergmann, 1984; Soares, 1988).  These claims are
reasonable if the criterion for a member state’s eligibility for additional support is
based on the level of average farm family income relative to the EU average.
However, the ranking of the member states on the basis of the SSD criterion
suggests that such aid would not be justified in terms of the farm family income
of the lowest income groups. It might be more appropriate to tackle specific
problems of farm indebtedness in Denmark (assuming the existence of suitable
policy instruments) before trying more generally to raise mean farm family
incomes in the Mediterranean states.
We would not wish though to over-emphasise the policy significance of our
empirical findings given the limitations of FADN data for the analysis of the
economic well-being of the agricultural community.  Instead, we see the main
value of the empirical study as being the demonstration of the potentially rich
analysis of welfare and poverty issues that would be possible given a data source
that provided information on the total income position of agricultural households
and thereby enabled valid comparisons to be drawn with other socio-economic
groups.  Following Hill (1996a), we therefore conclude by urging the
establishment of a microeconomic counterpart of the TIAH to complement the
sectoral-level indicators that have been developed in recent years.
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Notes
1.  See Lambert (1993) for an overview.  Note that we do not explore the use of
so-called abbreviated welfare functions (which are expressed simply as a
function of the mean income level and a summary inequality measure such as the
Gini coefficient) to provide a basis for the comparative evaluation of income
distributions.  Nor do we analyse the contributions of different sources of income
to the total inequality of incomes as in, for example, Ahearn et al. (1985).
2.  See Miller (1981) and Stoline and Ury (1979) for a description of these test
procedures, which have been widely applied to rank income distributions, and for
tables of the SMM distribution.
3.  If, as is usual, the final income class is unbounded then some arbitrary value
may be chosen for the upper boundary of the K-th class that is greater than the
assumed upper limit of the range.
4.  Beach et al. (1994) give recursive formulae for converting data on sample
means and variances by income class into the required cumulative estimates.
5.  All FADN results have been calculated in 1995 money values in national
currencies (using GDP implicit price indices as the deflators) and then converted
to ECU using 1995 exchange rates
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